SEARCH
0-9 A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z
Prev | Current Page 506 | Next

Brooke, L. Leslie, 1862-1940

"Selected Speeches on British Foreign Policy 1738-1914"

There are times when one feels
that if these circumstances actually did arise, it would be a feeling
which would spread with irresistible force throughout the land.
But I also want to look at the matter without sentiment, and from the
point of view of British interests, and it is on that that I am going
to base and justify what I am presently going to say to the House. If
we say nothing at this moment, what is France to do with her fleet in
the Mediterranean? If she leaves it there, with no statement from us
as to what we will do, she leaves her northern and western coasts
absolutely undefended, at the mercy of a German fleet coming down the
Channel, to do as it pleases in a war which is a war of life and death
between them. If we say nothing, it may be that the French fleet is
withdrawn from the Mediterranean. We are in the presence of a European
conflagration; can anybody set limits to the consequences that may
arise out of it? Let us assume that to-day we stand aside in an
attitude of neutrality, saying, 'No, we cannot undertake and engage to
help either party in this conflict.' Let us suppose the French fleet
is withdrawn from the Mediterranean; and let us assume that the
consequences--which are already tremendous in what has happened in
Europe even to countries which are at peace, in fact, equally whether
countries are at peace or at war--let us assume that out of that come
consequences unforeseen, which make it necessary at a sudden moment
that, in defence of vital British interests, we should go to war: and
let us assume--which is quite possible--that Italy, who is now neutral
because, as I understand, she considers that this war is an aggressive
war, and the Triple Alliance being a defensive alliance her obligation
did not arise--let us assume that consequences which are not yet
foreseen--and which, perfectly legitimately consulting her own
interests, make Italy depart from her attitude of neutrality at a time
when we are forced in defence of vital British interests ourselves to
fight, what then will be the position in the Mediterranean? It might
be that at some critical moment those consequences would be forced
upon us because our trade-routes in the Mediterranean might be vital
to this country.


Pages:
494 495 496 497 498 499 500 501 502 503 504 505 506 507 508 509 510 511 512 513 514 515 516 517 518