' There was
force in that. I agreed to it, and authorized those conversations
to take place, but on the distinct understanding that nothing which
passed between military or naval experts should bind either Government
or restrict in any way their freedom to make a decision as to whether
or not they would give that support when the time arose.
As I have told the House, upon that occasion a General Election was in
prospect. I had to take the responsibility of doing that without
the Cabinet. It could not be summoned. An answer had to be given.
I consulted Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman, the Prime Minister; I
consulted, I remember, Lord Haldane, who was then Secretary of State
for War, and the present Prime Minister, who was then Chancellor of
the Exchequer. That was the most I could do, and they authorized that,
on the distinct understanding that it left the hands of the Government
free whenever the crisis arose. The fact that conversations between
military and naval experts took place was later on--I think much
later on, because that crisis passed, and the thing ceased to be of
importance--but later on it was brought to the knowledge of the
Cabinet.
The Agadir crisis came--another Morocco crisis--and throughout that
I took precisely the same line that had been taken in 1906. But
subsequently, in 1912, after discussion and consideration in the
Cabinet it was decided that we ought to have a definite understanding
in writing, which was to be only in the form of an unofficial letter,
that these conversations which took place were not binding upon the
freedom of either Government; and on the 22nd of November, 1912, I
wrote to the French Ambassador the letter which I will now read to the
House, and I received from him a letter in similar terms in reply.
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