Now I must make this question
of obligation clear to the House. I must go back to the first Moroccan
crisis of 1906. That was the time of the Algeciras Conference, and it
came at a time of very great difficulty to His Majesty's Government
when a General Election was in progress, and Ministers were scattered
over the country, and I--spending three days a week in my constituency
and three days at the Foreign Office--was asked the question whether
if that crisis developed into war between France and Germany we would
give armed support. I said then that I could promise nothing to any
foreign Power unless it was subsequently to receive the whole-hearted
support of public opinion here if the occasion arose. I said, in
my opinion, if war was forced upon France then on the question of
Morocco--a question which had just been the subject of agreement
between this country and France, an agreement exceedingly popular on
both sides--that if out of that agreement war was forced on France
at that time, in my view public opinion in this country would have
rallied to the material support of France.
I gave no promise, but I expressed that opinion during the crisis, as
far as I remember, almost in the same words, to the French Ambassador
and the German Ambassador at the time. I made no promise, and I used
no threats; but I expressed that opinion. That position was accepted
by the French Government, but they said to me at the time--and I think
very reasonably--'If you think it possible that the public opinion
of Great Britain might, should a sudden crisis arise, justify you
in giving to France the armed support which you cannot promise in
advance, you will not be able to give that support, even if you wish
to give it, when the time comes, unless some conversations have
already taken place between naval and military experts.
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