Be it so: I will not press the point
invidiously--it is not necessary for my argument. I have a right then
to take it as admitted, that we could not have threatened war without
being thoroughly prepared for it; and that, in determining to
threaten, we must virtually have determined (whatever the chances of
escaping that ultimate result) to go to war--that the determinations
were in fact identical.
Neither will I discuss over again that other proposition, already
sufficiently exhausted in former debates, of the applicability of a
purely maritime war to a struggle in aid of Spain, in the campaign by
which her fate is to be decided. I will not pause to consider what
consolation it would have been to the Spanish nation--what source of
animation, and what encouragement to perseverance in resisting their
invader--to learn that, though we could not, as in the last war, march
to their aid, and mingle our banners with theirs in battle, we were,
nevertheless, scouring their coasts for prizes, and securing to
ourselves an indemnification for our own expenses in the capture of
Martinico.
To go to war therefore directly, unsparingly, vigorously against
France, in behalf of Spain, in the way in which alone Spain could
derive any essential benefit from our co-operation--to join her with
heart and hand, or to wrap ourselves up in a real and bona fide
neutrality--that was the true alternative.
Some gentlemen have blamed me for a want of enthusiasm upon this
occasion--some, too, who formerly blamed me for an excess of that
quality; but though I am charged with not being now sufficiently
enthusiastic, I assure them that I do not contemplate the present
contest with indifference.
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